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Note
"Random" Spot Checks And
the Fourth Amendment
State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975).
I. INTRODUCTION
State v. Holmberg' raised the question of whether "spot checks"
of motor vehicles, when based upon neither the "probable cause"
required for arrest,2 nor the "reasonable suspicion" sufficient for
an investigative seizure,3 are constitutional under the fourth
amendment.4 The case is the first to consider the constitutionality
of such stops in light of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,5 in which
the Supreme Court condemned similar stops by United States
Border Patrol officers. 6
The defendant, Gary Holmberg, was driving a pickup truck-
camper during the early morning hours on Interstate 80 in western
Nebraska. Trooper Hollis Compton7 of the Nebraska Safety Patrol
1. 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975).
2. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
3. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 162 (1924).
4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.
U.S. CoxsT. amend. IV.
5. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). See notes 26-47 infra and accompanying text.
6. The Holmberg opinion states:
[T]his opinion was written prior to the release of United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce .... It has been reaffirmed sub-
sequent to that decision upon the ground that footnote 8 limits
that case to Border Patrol agents, and specifically excepts the
situation present herein.
194 Neb. at 347, 231 N.W.2d at 678. See note 14 infra and accompany-
ing text.
7. Officer Compton was the arresting officer in several similar Nebraska
cases, including United States v. Harris, Crim. No. 74-0-116 (D. Neb.
Jan. 31, 1975); United States v. Pitchford, Crim. No. 74-0-47 (D. Neb.
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stopped the defendant's vehicle "for the purpose of checking his
operator's license, the vehicle registration and vehicle identification
number. There was no other reason for the stop."18  While doing
this, the officer smelled the odor of marijuana and observed
marijuana seeds on the floor of the vehicle. With the defendant's
consent,9 Trooper Compton searched the vehicle and found a sub-
stantial amount of marijuana. He arrested the defendant and took
him to jail, where a "strip search" disclosed more drugs. Holmberg
was convicted for possession of marijuana with the intent to dis-
tribute, deliver or dispense and for the possession of amphetamines
and cocaine. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Nebraska, he
argued that the stop was an unreasonable seizure under the
fourth amendment since it was unsupported by a reasonable sus-
picion of a violation of the law.10
Nov. 27, 1974); United States v. Bell, 383 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Neb. 1974);
State v. Shepardson, 194 Neb. 673, 235 N.W.2d 218 (1975); State v. Ro-
monto, 190 Neb. 825, 212 N.W.2d 641 (1973).
8. The officer acted under the authority of Nebraska law, providing in
part that:
[A]ll members of the Nebraska State Patrol and all other
peace officers shall have the power ... (4) when in uniform,
to require the driver [of any vehicle] to stop and exhibit his
operator's license and registration card issued for the vehicle,
and the registration plates and the registration card thereon
NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 60-435 (Reissue 1974).
The vehicle identification number on Hohnberg's camper was lo-
cated on the front door jamb of the vehicle. Brief for Appellant at 6.
When such vehicles are checked, it is necessary for the investigating
officer to open the door of the vehicle. Cf. Cotton v. United States,
371 F.2d 385, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1967).
9. The consent issue was argued in both briefs. The court, however, ap-
parently concluding that consent was given, did not discuss the issue
in its opinion.
10. The Holmberg opinion indicates the defendant argued that the mo-
mentary stopping of a motorist for an inspection constitutes an arrest,
requiring "probable cause." A reading of the briefs, however, indi-
cates the defendant did not contend that more than a "reasonable sus-
picion" of wrongdoing should be required. See Brief for Appellant on
Motion for Rehearing at 10. The court gave the issue short shrift:
Defendant is laboring under the misapprehension that the
same rule on probable cause applies when a person is merely
stopped and questioned is when he is arrested. Defendant's
approach presents a clash of interest between the protection
of the public and right of an individual. His premise is false
and would cripple law enforcement.
194 Neb. at 340, 231 N.W.2d at 675, quoting from State v. Carpenter,
181 Neb. 639, 644-45, 150 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1967).
Though Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), had indicated
that stopping a motor vehicle constituted an arrest, Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), foreclosed the possibility of a literal reading of Henry.
See Cook, Varieties of Detention and the Fourth Amendment, 23 ALA.
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Citing the state's interest in highway safety, the momentary
nature of the stop, the lack of alternatives for enforcing the state's
motor vehicle licensing laws," and the difficulty of enforcing such
laws when a reasonable suspicion is required, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska upheld the constitutionality of the statute authorizing
the stop, and affirmed the defendant's conviction. 1 The court added
that if the facts were to disclose that a stop was used as a pretext for
reasons unrelated to the enforcement of state licensing laws, the
stop would be held arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of the
fourth amendment. 13
L. Rnv. 287 (1971). Terry approved a limited, brief stop of a suspi-
cious individual in order to determine his identity or to obtain infor-
mation. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the
Supreme Court extended the suspicion test of Terry to the stopping of
a moving automobile. See 422 U.S. at 888 (Douglas, J., concurring);
notes 26-47 and accompanying text infra.
Under the "exclusionary rule" evidence obtained in an illegal
search or seizure may not be admitted into evidence against those
whose rights have been violated. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MN. L. REv. 349,
360-61 (1974).
11. The court stated: "Stopping the vehicles for inspection is the only
practical method of enforcement of section 60-435 R.R.S. 1943." 194
Neb. at 340, 231 N.W.2d at 675. The section, however, is merely an en-
forcement provision for Nebraska's licensing and registration statutes.
NEB. REV. SnTA. § 60-403 (Reissue 1974), provides:
Except as herein otherwise provided, no person, resident of
the state of Nebraska, shall operate a motor vehicle upon the
streets, alleys or public highways of the State of Nebraska un-
til such person shall have obtained a license for that purpose.
Nn.'REV. STAT. § 60-302 (Reissue 1974), provides:
No motor vehicle . . .shall be operated on the highways of
this state unless such vehicle is registered in accordance with
the provisions of this act....
12. See 194 Neb. at 347, 231 N.W.2d at 678.
13. Id. at 346, 231 N.W.2d at 678.
Three months after the Holmberg decision, the Nebraska Supreme
Court again considered the constitutionality of random spot checks. In
State v. Shepardson, 194 Neb. 673, 235 N.W.2d 218 (1975), the defend-
ant was driving a red van with a U-Haul trailer eastward on Inter-
state 80 in western Nebraska. Trooper Hollis Compton, see note 7 su-
pra, noticing the defendant's vehicle, turned his patrol car around, in-
tending to stop the defendant to check his driver's license and vehicle
registration papers. When Officer Compton caught up to the defend-
ant, the defendant had already stopped at a service station. After ex-
amining the defendant's driver's license and trailer rental agreement,
and while checking the vehicle number against the vehicle registra-
tion, the officer noticed what he believed to be marijuana seeds on the
threshold of the van's door and in front of the driver's seat. In re-
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The Holmberg court asserted that a footnote to the Brignoni-
,Ponce opinion1 4 limited that holding to stops by Border Patrol
agents, and, therefore, dismisssed Brignoni-Ponce as being inapplica-
ble. That case, however, represents the United States Supreme
Court's most recent discussion of the fourth amendment's applicabil-
ity to the stopping of automobiles, and as such, its reasoning is valu-
sponse to an inquiry by Officer Compton, the defendant produced a
bag containing a substance believed by the officer to be marijuana.
The defendant was arrested. A search of the van disclosed a sub-
stance believed by the officer to be marijuana, and the defendant was
charged with possession of a controlled substance. Prior to his trial,
he moved to have suppressed the evidence obtained during the search
of his vehicle. After a hearing overruling the motion, the defendant
was convicted. On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the de-
fendant argued that, in being confronted by the officer without cause,
he had been subjected to an unreasonable seizure in violation of the
fourth amendment. Though substantially reiterating the reasoning it
had followed in Holmberg, the court added:
Officer Compton testified that the defendant "didn't seem to
fit his vehicle." The thought occurred to Officer Compton that
the vehicle might be stolen. This, together with the authority
given Officer Compton under section 60-435 (4), R.R.S. 1943,
to make "random" and "spot" checks for proper vehicle reg-
istration papers, was sufficient justification for Officer Comp-
ton to approach the defendant's vehicle, which was already
stopped at a service station, and to make the initial inquiries
that he did. This court has recognized that the rule for prob-
able cause when a person is merely stopped and questioned is
not the. same as when a person is arrested.
194 Neb. 676, 235 N.W.2d 221.
What the court meant by this statement is unclear. The only inter-
pretation consistent with Holmberg is that, since a function of registra-
tion is to certify ownership, see Note, Automobile License Checks and
the Fourth Amendment, 60 VA. L. REv. 666, 687 n.103 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Automobile Checks and the Fourth Amendment]; State
v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932) (license-registration
checks justified, in part, as protection for automobile owners against
unauthorized use of their vehicles), the detection of auto theft is re-
lated to the purposes of section 60-435 and officers will be able to
rely on that section to justify stops made to investigate car thefts.
14. Our decision in this case takes into account the special func-
tion of the Border Patrol, the importance of the governmental
interests in policing the border area, the character of roving-
patrol stops, and the availability of alternatives to random
stops unsupported by reasonable suspicion. Border Patrol
agents have no part in enforcing laws that regulate highway
use, and their activities have nothing to do with an inquiry
whether motorists and their vehicles are entitled, by virtue of
compliance with laws governing highway usage, to be upon
the public highways. Our decision thus does not imply that
state and local enforcement agencies are without power to
conduct such stops as are necessary to enforce laws regarding
drivers' licenses, vehicle registration, truck weights, and sim-
lar matters.
422 U.S. at 883 n.8.
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able in considering whether automobile stops, in whatever context,
violate the fourth amendment. The court's failure to consider the
reasoning of Brignoni-Ponce leaves the Holmberg opinion ex-
tremely unsatisfying.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURES
The basic purpose of the, fourth amendment,1 as the Supreme
Court has consistently affirmed, is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials. 16 The amendment applies to all seizures of the person,
including those that involve only a brief detention short of tradi-
tional arrest.1' By its language, it prohibits only those seizures
that are "unreasonable,"' 8 with the reasonableness of a particular
search or seizure determined by balancing the governmental and
individual interests at stake.' 9 A seizure of the person occurs
"whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away."
20
A police officer may arrest a suspect only when he has "prob-
able cause" to do so--only when "the facts and circumstances
known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the
offense has been committed."' 2 1  But in Terry v. Ohio,22 the
Supreme Court approved an investigative seizure-a pat-down for
weapons-based upon facts not amounting to probable cause: 23
15. See note 4 supra.
16. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). The fourth
amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth. Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. See 422 U.S. at 878; Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968).
18. 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
19. Id. See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Cook, supra note
10.
20. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). See also LaFave, "Street En-
counters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond,
67 MIc H. L. REv. 39 (1968).
21. See note 3 supra.
22. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
23. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), the Court, extending Terry,
held that an investigative seizure, absent a frisk, was justified when
based upon a reasonable suspicion:
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who
lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable
cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry
recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to
adopt an immediate response .... A brief stop of a suspi-
cious individual, in order to determine his identity or to main-
tain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more in-
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only a "reasonable suspicion" was required. However, under Terry,
the officer must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion."24  "Anything less," wrote
Chief Justice Warren, "would invite intrusions upon constitution-
ally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inar-
ticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to
sanction.
'25
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court ex-
tended the Terry "suspicion" test to the stopping of a moving auto-
mobile.26 Two officers of the United States Border Patrol, as part
of the Patrol's regular traffic checking operations in southern Cali-
fornia,27 were observing northbound traffic from a patrol car
parked at the side of the highway, the car's headlights being used
to illuminate passing cars. The officers pursued and stopped the
defendant's car solely because its three occupants appeared to be
of Mexican descent. When it was determined that the driver's two
passengers were aliens who had entered the country illegally, all
three were arrested. The defendant was charged with two counts
of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants, in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324 (a) (2). 2 8 At trial, he moved to suppress the testi-
formation, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known
to the officer at the time.
Id. at 145-46.
24. 392 U.S. at 21.
25. Id. at 22.
26. See 422 U.S. 873, 888 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring).
27. See notes 48-53 infra and accompanying text.
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970), provides:(a) Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot,
master, commanding officer, agent, or consignee of any means
of transportation who-
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in
violation of law, and knowing or having reasonable
grounds to believe that his last entry into the United
States occurred less than three years prior thereto,
transports, or moves, or attempts to transport or
move, within the United States by means of transpor-
tation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation
of law;
any alien, including an alien crewman, not duly admitted by
an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or re-
side within the United States under the terms of this chapter
or any other law relating to the immigration or expulsion of
aliens, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by impris-
onment for a term not exceeding five years, or both, for each
alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsection oc-
curs ....
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mony of his two passengers. After denial of the motion, he was
convicted on both counts. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, applying the principles of Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States,29 held that the fourth amendment forbids stopping a
vehicle, even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants,
unless the officers have a "founded suspicion" that the vehicle con-
tains aliens illegally in the country. The court said that Mexican an-
cestry alone could not support such a "founded suscipion," and held
that the motion to suppress should have been granted.30 An appeal
was subsequently made to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court sustained the decision of the court of appeals.
Referring to Terry and Adams v. Williams,'3 1 it declared:
These cases together establish that in appropriate circum-
stances the Fourth Amendment allows a properly limited "search"
or "seizure" on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest
or to search for contraband or evidence of crime .... The limited
searches and seizures in [Terry and Adams] were a valid method
of protecting the public and preventing crime. In this case as well,
because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake,
the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical
alternatives for policing the border, we hold that when an officer's
observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular
vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may
stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion.8 2
But the Court refused to allow Border Patrol officers to stop
vehicles upon less than a reasonable suspicion:
We are unwilling to let the Border Patrol dispense entirely with
the requirement that officers must have a reasonable suspicion to
justify roving-patrol stops. In the context of border area stops, the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment demands
something more than the broad and unlimited discretion sought by
the Government .... To approve roving-patrol stops of all ve-
hicles in the border area, without any suspicion that a particular
vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents
of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with
29. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). In Almeida-Sanchez, the Court held that the
Border Patrol's warrantless search of the defendant's automobile, at a
point twenty-five miles north of the Mexican border, was violative of
the fourth amendment. Evidence seized in the search was not admis-
sible against the defendant, because the search was without probable
cause or consent. The Court refused to equate the search with admin-
istrative inspections (see text accompanying notes 87-90), because the
officers had neither a warrant nor any reason to believe that the de-
fendant had been engaged in illegal activity.
30. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974).
31. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See note 23 supra.
32. 422 U.S. at 881.
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their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol
officers.33
Prior to Brignoni-Ponce, Border Patrol officers had exercised broad
powers in stopping vehicles, with their jurisdiction limited only to
within a "reasonable distance" 34 from the border.35  In reaching
its decision to limit the Patrol's authority, the Court considered
three central factors: (1) the importance of the governmental
interest at stake, (2) the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and (3)
the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border.36
33. Id. at 882. See United States v. Byrd, 520 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975).
Similarly, in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925),
the Court said:
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition
agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance
of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using
the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a
search. ... [T]hose lawfully within the country entitled to
use the public highways, have a right to free passage without
interruption or search unless there is known to a competent
official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that
their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1970) provides:
(a) Any officer or employee of the service authorized under
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have
power without warrant-
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an
alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United
States;
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States, to board and search for
aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the
United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance,
or vehicle ....
35. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a) (1975), which defines "reasonable distance" as
100 miles from the border.
36. Similarly, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), where
the Court held that the state's interest in enforcing a municipal hous-
ing code justified an invasion of an individual's privacy, the Court
considered the following elements as being persuasive:
First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance .... Second, the public interest demands that all
dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubt-
ful that any other canvassing technique would achieve ac-
ceptable results. Many such conditions-faulty wiring is an
obvious example-are not observable from outside the build-
ing and indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant
himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither personal
in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime,
they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citi-
zen's privacy.
Id. at 537. See Automobile Checks and the Fourth Amendment, supra
note 13, at 683-88.
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In regard to the first point, the importance of the Border
Patrol's function, the Court observed that as many as twelve
million aliens were illegally in the country, an estimated eighty-
five per cent of whom were from Mexico. 37 Obviously impressed
with the magnitude of the problem, the Court noted the economic
and social problems created by illegal immigrants, the competition
for jobs between them and the rest of the population, the increased
demand for social services, and the fact that "aliens themselves
are vulnerable to exploitation because they cannot complain of
substandard working conditions without risking deportation.1
3 8
As the second factor, the Court wrote that since a stop by a
roving patrol "usually consumes no more than a minute, '39 such
a stop could be justified on facts that do not amount to the prob-
able cause required for arrest. The brevity of the stop was not,
however, persuasive that less than a reasonable suspicion would
suffice as justification for such stops. 40
Lastly, the Court discussed the existence of alternatives to stops
unsupported by reasonable suspicion. It stated that "the nature
of illegal alien traffic and the characteristics of smuggling op-
erations tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying viola-
tors,"4 1 and enumerated, but did not express an opinion on the
merits of4 2 several factors Border Patrol officers might take into
account in deciding whether or not to stop a car in the border area.
They include the characteristics of the area in which the officers
encounter a vehicle, the area's proximity to the border, the usual
patterns of traffic on the particular road, and previous experience
with alien traffic.4 3 Information about illegal border crossings in
37. See United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
38. 422 U.S. at 878-79.
39. Id. at 880.
40. Although not expressly discussed in the opinion, the question of
whether roving-patrol stops are personal in nature or aimed at the dis-
covery of evidence of crime was implicitly considered by the Court.
In Camara, the nonpersonal nature of building inspections was in
part persuasive of the constitutionality of a search made with a
warrant granted on less than probable cause. Roving-patrol stops
by the Border Patrol are both personal in nature and aimed at the
discovery of evidence of crime. See note 13 supra.
41. 422 U.S. at 883.
42. Id. at 890 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas noted that:
[B]y specifying factors to be considered without attempting
to explain what combination is necessary to satisfy the test,
the Court may actually induce the police to push its language
beyond intended limits and to advance as a justification any
of the enumerated factors even where its probative signifi-
cance is negligible.
43. Id. at 884-85. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159-61 (1925);
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the area, the driver's behavior,44 the appearance of the vehicle
itself,45 or even whether the mode of dress or haircut of the occu-
pants of the vehicle is characteristic of persons who live in Mex-
ico4 6 may also be factors to consider. Clearly, even when a
"reasonable suspicion" is required, Border Patrol officers retain a
fair amount of discretion.47
As an alternative to roving-patrol stops based upon a reasonable
suspicion, the Border Patrol's procedures include maintaining estab-
lished checkpoints on highways leading from the border.48 Since
Brignoni-Ponce was limited to roving-patrol stops, the Court did
not indicate what standards would apply for the stopping of motor-
ists at established checkpoints. However, in United States v.
Ortiz,49 a companion case to Brignoni-Ponce, the Court, though hold-
ing that the "probable cause" standard applied no less to a search at
a fixed checkpoint than to a search made by a roving patrol, did
intimate that different standards might apply at fixed checkpoints
if official discretion could be significantly reduced. In Ortiz, two
Border Patrol officers stopped the defendant's car for a "routine
immigration search" at an established traffic checkpoint, sixty-six
road miles north of the Mexican border in southern California.50 A
United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 972 (1974).
44. See United States v. Larios Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974); Du-
prez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1970).
45. Border Patrol "officers say that certain station wagons, with large
compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires, are frequently used
for transporting concealed aliens." 422 U.S. at 885. See also United
States v. Burgarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1136 (1974); United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.
1973).
46. 422 U.S. at 885.
47. But see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 899 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
48. See note 50 infra.
49. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
50. The Court described the checkpoint as follows:
Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint is a large
black on yellow sign with flashing yellow lights over thehighway stating 'ALL VEHICLES, STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE.'
Three-quarters of a mile further north are two black on yel-low signs suspended over the highway with flashing lights
stating 'WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS.' At the checkpoint,
which is also the location of a State 
of California weighing
station, are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended
over the highway. These sgns each state 'STOP HERE-U.S.
O ICERS.' Placed on the highway are a number of orange
traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes where a Border
Patrol agent in full dress uniform, standing behind a white on
red 'STOP' sign checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused
lanes are official U.S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red
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search of the trunk of the car disclosed three aliens illegally in the
country. Later, the defendant was convicted of transporting illegal
aliens. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
Almeida-Sanchez, which required probable cause for searches con-
ducted by roving patrols, applied as well to searches conducted at
established traffic checkpoints. The court reversed the conviction
on the ground that the search of defendant's vehicle was made
without probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
"[wihile the differences between a roving patrol and a checkpoint
would be significant in determining the propriety of the stop,
which is considerably less intrusive than a search, . . . they do not
appear to make any difference in the search itself."51 Further,
since the Border Patrol agent's discretion as to whether to search
was not significantly limited at the established checkpoint, the
probable cause standard was a necessary check on official discre-
tion. But the Court withheld judgment on whether a Border
Patrol officer might lawfully stop a motorist for questioning at an
established checkpoint without reason to believe that the particular
vehicle was carrying aliens.52  Clearly, if Border Patrol officers
were given such latitude, a significant alternative to the roving-
patrol stop would be at their disposal. That issue is particularly
relevant in considering the validity of spot checks, where the only
practical alternative to stops unsupported by a reasonable suspicion
may well be the more systematic, indiscriminatory roadblock.53
Since the Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce refused to allow
Border Patrol officers to exercise the broad discretionary powers
granted them without a reasonable suspicion of a violation of the
immigration laws, the major issue to be considered in examining
Holmberg is whether the special problems inherent in the enforce-
ment of licensing and registration laws justify dispensing with the
"suspicion" requirement deemed necessary in Brignoni-Ponce.
III. AUTOMOBILE STOPS
The motor vehicle laws of every state contain provisions requir-
ing persons operating motor vehicles to be licensed,5 4 and the
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building which
houses the Border Patrol office and temporary detention facil-
ities. There are also floodlights for nighttime operation.
Id. at 893, quoting from United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 410-
11 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
51. 422 U.S. at 895 (emphasis added).
52. See id. at 897, n.3.
53. See notes 86-91 supra and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., CAL. VEmicLE CoDE, § 12500 (West 1971); N.Y, VEcLE
TwR'pc LAW § 509 (Mc.inney Supp. 1975),
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motor vehicles to be properly registered. 5 These laws generally
require that the driver's license and registration papers be shown
upon demand to law enforcement officers, who have, in some states,
been granted express statutory authority to stop motor vehicles and
make such examinations.5" Where express authority has not been
granted, courts have often found the implied authority in licensing
and registration statutes to compel a stop.57
Where inspection stops have been challenged as unlawful
seizures, the courts, in balancing the governmental and individual
interests, have reached differing conclusions. One line of cases,
including State v. Holmberg, strikes the balance in favor of the
state and adopts the position that if an inspection stop is a pretext
for other motives the stop will be held invalid.58  illustrative of
this view is Palmore v. United States.59 In that case, two District
of Columbia police officers, recognizing from the Virginia license
tags on it that the defendant's car had been rented, decided to run
a "spot check" to determine if the defendant had a proper license
and rental agreement (the equivalent of proper registration). The
defendant had committed no moving traffic violation, and his
vehicle had no apparent equipment defect. During the stop, one
of the officers, positioned at the right front window of the car, saw
the trigger mechanism of a pistol protruding out from beneath the
arm rest on the front door of the defendant's car. He seized the
weapon and, after learning that it was unregistered, placed the
defendant under arrest. Responding to the defendant's contention
that the stop constituted an unreasonable seizure, the court said:
At the outset, we reject the rigid rule which appellant urges us
to adopt: That a police officer may stop an automobile for a
spot check of the driver's license and the car's registration only
when he has articulable suspicion, as defined in Terry, that
either of such documents is invalid. The touchstone of the fourth
amendment is reasonableness. It seems to us in this age of the
motor car that when the community's interest in limiting use of
its highways to licensed drivers in registered autos is balanced
against the momentary interruption of the motorist which is
55. Automobile License Checks and the Fourth Amendment, supra note
13, at 670; see, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 4000 (West 1971); N.Y. VE-
niCLE & TPAmc LAW § 401 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
56. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN . § 321.05(1) (Supp. 1973-74); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 60-435 (Reissue 1974).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Lepinski, 460F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1972).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 459 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1972); My-
ricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1967); Lipton v. United
States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965); Bowling v. United States, 450 F.2d
1002 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Montana v. Tomich, 332 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1964).
59. 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. App. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 389
(1973).
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necessary to ascertain whether he is complying with these licensing
requirements such intrusion is not so unreasonable as to be viola-
tive of the fourth amendment. 60
The court further held that requiring an articulable suspicion
"might render virtually unenforceable the congressional prohibition
against all unlicensed drivers and unregistered cars driving on
District of Columbia streets,"6' and added that "a 'spot check' is
not to be used as a substitute for a search for evidence of some
crime unrelated to possession of a driver's permit'. ' 62  Although
many cases have expressed a similar willingness to hold invalid spot
checks used as a pretext for other reasons,6 3 few have actually done
so 64 and those only when the stop in question was clearly a
sham.65 Several other cases have stated or implied that a stop
to investigate other activity may be justified as a "routine license
check" even where the officers do not have either probable cause
or a reasonable suspicion sufficient to support an investigation of
such other activity. 6
A second, shorter line of cases that began essentially with
Commonwealth v. Swanger, 7 has struck the balance in favor of
the individual.0 8 In Swanger, two police officers stopped the car
60. Id. at 582 (footnotes omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id., quoting from Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507, 508
(D.C. App. 1966).
63. See cases cited in note 58 supra.
64. See Montana v. Tomich, 332 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1964); State v. Rosen-
berg, 24 Ariz. App. 341, 538 P.2d 770 (1975). In Rosenberg, the court
noted that:
[W]hile we are not prepared to say the trial court incorrectly
determined that the registration check was not merely a pre-
tense to execute an illegal search, the circumstances of the of-
ficer checking only this "hippy" type vehicle, his failure to
await the results of his radio check for stolen vehicle and his
snatching articles from the car without probable cause, lends
credence to the suspicion that the registration check was
merely a subterfuge.
65. See Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 445 n.110.
66. See United States v. Geelan, 509 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 999 (1975); United States v. Kelley, 462 F.2d 372 (4th Cir.
1972); United States v. Turner, 442 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1971); Rodgers
v. United States, 362 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1966); D'argento v. United
States, 353 F.2d 327 (1965); State v. Ream, 19 Ariz. App. 131, 505 P.2d
569 (1973); State ex rel. Berger v. Cantor, 13 Ariz. App. 555, 479 P.2d
432 (1970); State v. Cobbuzzi, 161 Conn. 371, 288 A.2d 439 (1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1972); State v. Grabowski, 206 Kan. 532,
479 P.2d 830, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 918 (1971); State v. Allen, 282 N.C.
503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973). But see United States v. Harris, 404 F. Supp.
1116, 1123 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
67. 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973).
68. See State v. Puig, 23 Ariz. App. 516, 534 P.2d 447 (1975); State v.
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in which the defendant was riding for a "routine check." Author-
ity to make the stop was based upon a Pennsylvania statute6 9
similar to the Nebraska law. 0 Burglar's tools observed inside the
car during the stop were used to convict the defendant of burglary
after the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence as the product
of an illegal seizure was denied. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania reversed the lower court's decision, articulating its reasoning
as follows:
Focusing on the government interest, the Commonwealth asserts
the automobile is a dangerous instrumentality, one of the nation's
highest ranking causes of death. It is argued that in order to insure
the safety of the highways and for the protection of the public, the
police should be given the right to stop automobiles at random,
without cause, to ascertain if the operator and the vehicle meet the
comprehensive standards set forth in the Motor Vehicle Code. On
the other side, we must consider the personal liberty and the right
of the individual to be free from government intrusions without
apparent reason. On balance, we conclude that the interest of the
individual outweighs that of the Commonwealth. 1
The Swanger court found most objectionable the fact that there
could be no judicial review of stops made without apparent justi-
fication, and held that, before officers can single out a particular
vehicle for a stop, they must be able to point to specific and articul-
able facts that justify a reasonable suspicion of some violation of
the law.
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court chose to follow the
Palmore line of cases, Holmberg is unique, as it represents the first
case to consider the validity of random spot checks in light of
Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz.
IV. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
The first element considered in Brignoni-Ponce was the impor-
tance of the governmental interest at stake. There, despite the
acknowledged importance of diminishing the flow of illegal aliens,
the Court refused to allow Border Patrol officers to stop vehicles
Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, 534 P.2d 441 (1975); People v. Grace, 32
Cal. App. 3d 447, 108 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1973); People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d
413, 330 N.E.2d 39, - N.Y.S.2d - (1975).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1221(b) (1971) provides:
Any peace officer, who shall be in unifonn, and shall ex-
hibit his badge or other sign of authority, shall have the right
to stop any vehicle, upon request or signals for the purpose of
inspecting the said vehicle, as to its equipment and operation,
and securing of such other information as may be necessary.
70. See note 8 supra.
71. 453 Pa. at 111-12, 307 A.2d at 878 (footnotes omitted).
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without a "reasonable suspicion." Brignoni-Ponce clearly stands
for the proposition that the importance of a governmental interest
standing alone will not justify dispensing with the "suspicion" test.
The interests at stake in the licensing check are, perhaps, not
as great as those present in the context of Border Patrols.7 2 High-
way safety has been the primary justification whether the proce-
dure has included vehicle inspection or merely a check of the oper-
ator's license and the vehicle's registration. One court expressed
its concern about highway safety in the following way:
The State has a legitimate interest in the roadworthiness of
automobiles which transport, but which can maim and kill. This
comprehends both technical fitness of the driver and the mechani-
cal fitness of the machine. After the event it is always too late.
The State can practice preventative therapy by reasonable road
checks to ascertain whether man and machine meet the legislative
determination of fitness. That this requires a momentary stopping
of the traveling citizen is not fatal. Nor is it because the inspection
may produce the irrefutable proof that the law has just been
violated. The purpose of the check is to determine the present, not
the past: is the car, is the driver now fit for further driving? In
the accommodation of society's needs to the basic right of citizens
to be free from disruption of unrestricted travel by police officers
stopping cars in the hopes of uncovering the evidence of nontraffic
crimes, . . . the stopping for road checks is reasonable and there-
fore acceptable.73
Few courts have challenged the assumption, implicit above, that
state licensing and registration laws contribute to highway safety. 4
In addition, none of the cases researched discussed the signifi-
cance of there being more properly licensed drivers on the road
driving cars that are, apparently, mechanically sound, than there
are licensing statute violators. In Brignoni-Ponce, however, the
Supreme Court expressed concern that substantial numbers of
law abiding citizens could be subjected to governmental intru-
sion.75 The danger is equally great in the context of inspection
stops.
The second consideration in Brignoni-Ponce was the nature and
scope of the intrusion. Rather than confronting the potential for
72. See State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 347, 231 N.W.2d 672, 679 (1975)
(dissenting opinion).
73. Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1967).
74. State v. Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, 534 P.2d 441 (1975); cf. People v.
Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 193-94, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 842, 496 P.2d
1205, 1210 (1972), where the Supreme Court of California, referring to
a California statute requiring that a registration card be kept in each
motor vehicle, said "it bears remembering that section 4454 is essen-
tially a regulatory measure and does not protect the public from either
dangerous driving or unsafe equipment."
75. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975).
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arbitrary governmental interference with the individual, the Holm-
berg court focused on the inconvenience to the motoring public that
would ensue if roadblocks, rather than spot checks, were used, and
held that spot checks were, therefore, preferable. As the central
concern of the fourth amendment has always been the shielding
of the individual from arbitrary governmental intrusions," the
court's aim seems somewhat wide of the mark. In Brignoni-Ponce,
interference with the motoring public as a class was significant only
insofar as individual members of that class could be discriminatorily
intruded upon.
Moreover, in Brignoni-Ponce, the brevity of the stop did not
convince the Court of the stop's constitutionality. In the spot
check, as in the roving-patrol stop, the detention is momentary,
usually consuming no more than one or two minutes. Indeed, if
there is any distinction to be made as to the scope of the two intru-
sions, the spot check, where the officer may often open the door
of the vehicle to check the vehicle identification number located
on the door jamb, seems the more intrusive of the two.77
The Supreme Court has, irregularly, in search and seizure cases,
weighed in the balance the degree to which the search or seizure
was personal or impersonal. Though the factor was not expressly
discussed in Brignoni-Ponce-perhaps because the case involved
only the stopping, and not the searching of a vehicle-the Supreme
Court has, in other cases, given the factor considerable weight. For
example, in Camara v. Municipal Court,78 the Court approved
municipal housing inspections made with warrants issued without
probable cause in part because the inspections were "neither per-
sonal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime. '7
The highway inspection stop, like the roving-patrol stop, is, however,
both personal in nature (i.e., directed at selected motorists) and
aimed at the detection of crime.80 The police officer, because
his discretion is virtually uncurbed is guided only by the quirks
of his own personality and can selectively detain any individual
driver. Labeling such stops as "random," with the implication that
they can be made impartially, would seem to be a weak argument
when there is no judicial review of the officer's initial decision.
Neither in the importance of the governmental interest, nor in
the nature and scope of the intrusion, can random spot checks be
76. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Shmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
77. Cf. Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 395 (1967).
78. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
79. Id. at 537.
S0, See note 13 supra,
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significantly distinguished from roving-patrol stops at the border.
The central difference lies in the third factor considered in
Brignoni-Ponce: the availability of alternatives to random stops
unsupported by reasonable suspicion. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court
emphasized the point that smuggling operations tend to generate
articulable grounds for suspicion. The same cannot be said for
licensing violations, at least under current systems of licensing and
registration.8 ' Alternatives, less susceptible to official abuse than
the random check, are, however, available.
First, there may be instances, albeit limited in number, when
violations of state licensing laws are observable. Nonpossession of
a driver's license reasonably might be inferred where the driver
of a vehicle appears too young to be licensed to drive.82 A viola-
tion of the state registration laws might be evidenced by an
apparent lack of license plates or registration sticker,8 3 or by
damage to or obstruction of the license plates.8 4 Another possi-
bility is that law enforcement officers might reasonably check a
driver's license and registration as part of a detention based initially
upon an apparent violation of the state's laws regarding the opera-
tion and maintenance of motor vehicles, or pursuant to an investi-
gation initiated because a vehicle met the description of a stolen
81. The Report of the President's Task Force on Highway Safety recom-
mends the following reforms:
Enforcement of the suspended or revoked driver license is
virtually nonexistent for all practical purposes because of dif-
ficulties of identification. Specially coded license plates
should be employed in demonstration programs to determine
their effectiveness in controlling driving without a valid li-
cense. Such tags should enable police to identify the person
convicted, while not interfering with use of the car by other
family members. It is recommended that consideration be
given to impounding the car or revoking the license plates of
a car driven by a person without a valid license when in-
volved in an accident.
MOBILITY WITHOUT MAYHEM, THE REPORT OF THE PREsmENT s TASK
FORCE ON HIGHWAY SAFETY 39 (1970).
82. State v. Puig, 23 Ariz. App. 516, 534 P.2d 449 (1975).
83. See United States v. Harris, Crim. No. 74-0-116 (D. Neb. January 31,
1975); United States v. Bell, 383 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Neb. 1974). In
Harris, the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
determined that the presence of both a license plate and an "in transit"
sticker on a vehicle was sufficient to justify the suspicion that a licens-
ing violation was being committed. On that basis, the court found
NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-435 (Reissue 1974) to be constitutional. Earlier,
in Bell, the same court had invalidated a similar stop as unsupported
by a reasonable suspicion. Both Harris and Bell were decided before
Holmberg. However, neither was cited in the majority opinion.
84. State v. Wood, 195 Neb. 353, - N.W.2d - (1976); see State v. Ro-
mento, 190 Neb. 825, 827, 212 N.W.2d 641, 643 (1973).
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car.8 5 And third, Supreme Court cases strongly suggest that
more systematic, less discriminatory methods of enforcing state
licensing laws might well be sustained as analogous to administra-
tive inspections.8 6 In Camara v. Municipal Court8 7 and See v.
City of Seattle,88 the Court approved municipal housing and fire
code inspections authorized by warrants issued without probable
cause, because such inspections were conducted under routine,
periodic, city-wide procedures. As no individual dwelling or
business was singled out, the "searches" were, essentially, imper-
sonal.8 9 The Court has also held that where statutory procedures
are sufficiently prescriptive to reduce the chance of official abuse,
specific justification for the initial intrusion may not be required.0
In the context of automobile stops, official discretion can be sig-
nificantly curbed through the use of roadblocks, where all passing
motorists are routinely stopped for a momentary check, and where
stopping procedures are extensively regulated by statute. When
all travelers are stopped, the likelihood of embarassment to the
individual is less than where only a few are singled out. Moreover,
a properly designed checkpoint that gives the motorist advance
notice of the reason for the stop is less frightening to the individ-
ual than being stopped by a patrol car with its lights flashing.
Even where, as a matter of course, every fifth vehicle is stopped,
official discretion is significantly reduced. For these reasons, sys-
tematic stops stand as preferable and practical alternatives to spot
checks. 91 It is difficult to justify spot checks by arguing that no
85. See State v. Puig, 23 Ariz. App. 516, 534 P.2d 449 (1975); State v. Sev-
erance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968); Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962); Note, Automobile Spot Checks
and the Fourth Amendment, 6 RuTGERs CAlmVm L.J. 85, 100 (1974).
86. See Cook, supra note 10, at 313.
87. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
88. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
89. See Comment, Camara and See: Accommodation Between the Right of
Privacy and the Public Need, 47 NEB. L. RBv. 613 (1968).
90. Cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
In Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973), the
court distinguished the administrative inspection cases from random
inspection stops:
In See the "search" was part of a routine, periodic city-wide
canvass of commercial buildings, and in Camara the "search"
was part of an annual inspection of dwelling houses. These
situations lack the arbitrariness inherent in the present case.
The "searches" in See and Camara were part of a systematic
plan, whereas, the seizure here lacked any semblance of being
part of a systematic plan. The factual situations are very
much different.
Id. at 114, 307 A.2d at 879.
91. See cases cited in note 85 supra.
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practical alternatives are available for enforcing licensing and
registration laws.9
2
V. CONCLUSION
The danger of arbitrary governmental interference, inherent in
the random spot check, far outweighs the interest of the state in
enforcing its licensing laws through "random" stops. Roadblocks,
less susceptible to official abuse, are preferable alternatives to a
virtually unreviewable procedure. In the future, courts should
heed the reasoning of the Brignoni-Ponce decision, and require at
least a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing as a condition precedent
to the selective stopping of motor vehicles.
Stewart Walker '77
92. A number of cases have upheld the validity of roadblocks used to
check driver's licenses and vehicle registrations. See, e.g., Miami v.
Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959); State v. Severance, 108 N.H.
404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968); Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150
So. 2d 512 (1963).
